A World In Hunger: East Africa And Beyond

A far wealthier world is more divided, and contains nearly twice as many malnourished people, as was the case in the early 1970s. These facts alone are a damning criticism of the way the world economic system has evolved, writes Paul Rogers.

A DROUGHT across much of east Africa in mid-2011 is causing intense distress among vulnerable populations, many of them already pressed by poverty and insecurity. The range of  the affected areas is extensive: the two districts in Somalia that are now designated as famine-zones are but the most extreme parts of a much wider disaster that stretches from Somalia across Ethiopia into northern Kenya, and as far west as Sudan and even the Karamoja district in northeast Uganda.

The numbers put at risk in this, the worst drought in the region since the 1950s, are enormous. At least 11 million people are touched by the disaster. In the Turkana district of northern Kenya, 385,000 children (among a total population of about 850,000) are suffering from acute malnutrition (see Miriam Gathigah, ‘East Africa: millions stare death in the face amidst ravaging drought’, TerraViva / IPS, July 18, 2011). In Somalia, the conflict between the Islamist Shabaab movement and the nominal government makes conditions even more perilous for those affected.

The world’s largest refugee camp, at Dadaab in northern Kenya, offers a stark illustration of the consequences of the drought. The population of Dadaab, which was designed to cope with 90,000 people, has increased in recent months to 380,000 —  and 1,300 more are arriving daily (see Denis Foynes, ‘Eleven million at risk in horn of Africa’, TerraViva / IPS, July 19, 2011).

The lessons of crisis:

BUT just as striking is that this is part of a recurring phenomenon. Major warning-signs of malnutrition and famine were already visible in April 2008; among them were climatic factors, steep oil-price increases, increased demand for meat diets by richer communities, and the diversion of land to grow biofuel crops (see ‘The world’s food insecurity’, April 24, 2008).

What made these ingredients more perilous was the way that (as is so often the case) they acted synergistically. The clearest example of this was the sustained world food crisis of 1973-74, when (at its peak) some 40 million people in thirty countries were at risk. The overall predicament derived from a combination of two long-term and five more immediate factors.

The long-term issues were the relative neglect of rural development since the 1950s, and the fact that many countries were just starting to make the demographic transition (meaning that they still had 40 per cent or more of their population under the age of 14). These were intensified by the short-term problems: the coincidence of poor weather conditions (including the seven-year drought in the Sahel and floods in south Asia), a huge increase in oil and fertiliser prices, increased demand for meat in northern countries, the failure of the green revolution to deliver sufficiently robust new crop varieties, and rampant commodity-market speculation that also forced up prices.

In the event the crisis of 1973-74 did not tip into real disaster. A transnational famine was avoided, partly because a few states (notably the newly wealthy middle-east oil-producers) belatedly provided enough aid. But the most significant aspect was that throughout, the world’s grain reserves were substantial; they did fall to around half of the usual stocks, but even at the peak of the crisis still averaged around 100 days of supply. The problem the crisis revealed was that far too many people could not grow enough of their own food and could not afford the inflated prices in local or national markets. At the heart of the emergency were issues of poverty and economic marginalisation.

The lessons of a near-catastrophe were never learned. The then United Nations plan for a major increase in tropical agricultural research and development was costed at the equivalent of 2 per cent of world military expenditure per year, yet barely a third of the money needed was actually raised.

There have since been nearly four decades of ‘development’, with contrasting outcomes: the world has grown very much richer yet the great bulk of the new wealth has benefited the richest 1.5 billion in a global population that the United Nations estimates will reach 7 billion in October 2011. A far wealthier world is more divided, and contains nearly twice as many malnourished people, as was the case in the early 1970s. These facts alone are a damning criticism of the way the world economic system has evolved, and in particular of the neglect of food security for tens of millions of poor and vulnerable people.

The climate factor:

WHAT makes this situation even more pressing is that it is now reinforced by the existing and likely impacts of climate change (see ‘The climate peril: a race against time’, November 13, 2009).

There is abundant evidence that the rate of temperature increase in coming decades will be faster over the tropical and sub-tropical land-masses — as much as three times the worldwide average in many such regions. The early effects will include a marked decline in what Lester Brown has called the ‘reservoirs in the sky’: the glaciated regions of the high Andes and the far greater water-stores locked up in the Himalaya and the Karakoram (sometimes termed ‘the third pole’) (see Lester R Brown, ‘Rising temperatures melting away global food security’, TerraViva / IPS, July 6, 2011).

The dry coastal areas of Peru and other parts of western south America depend on the Andean glaciers. But the value of the south Asian glaciers is hugely greater since they feed the Ganges, Indus, Brahmaputra and other river systems on which hundreds of millions of people depend for food. When the ‘reservoirs’ shrivel and temperatures rise, the result is increased heat- and water-stress in crops, causing yields to fall and thus food shortages. Such shortages already exist, as the east African crisis shows; on present trends they will become far worse in the coming decades (see ‘A century on the edge: 1945-2045’, December 29, 2008).

A degree of adaptation is in principle possible, not least through key technological and political changes: 

improving water conservation and the breeding of drought-resistant crops, and reforming the world economy to ensure far more equity and economic emancipation (see Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1999). These innovations alone would be near-revolutionary — but still not enough to solve the problems. This requires bringing climate change under control via a ‘great transition’ to ultra-low carbon economies.

The current crisis in east Africa requires immediate coordinated action to alleviate the widespread suffering. It is also a powerful reminder of the far larger efforts needed here and elsewhere, which are amplified by the preceding decades of neglect and waste. The ability to achieve the great transition — with all it entails in terms of sustainable livelihoods and social organisation — will determine whether the planet’s next generations are guaranteed the food and other resources to enable them to survive and build fulfilled lives.

The Crusade of 1101

In the Wake of Victory

Europeans were overjoyed to learn of the success of the First Crusade. With the news of the victory, however, came pleas for reinforcements and the people of Europe respond with enthusiasm. Rich and poor alike were eager to make their own pilgrimage to the Holy Land, to battle the infidel, and to win for themselves the earthly glory and the spiritual rewards that came with being being crucesignati. 

A new crusade was already being preached in the spring of 1099 by the Archbishop of Milan, for Urban knew that the crusaders were in dire need of help. Thus, in Lombardy, the preaching was already well under way, and being met with strong response, when the news of the fall of Jerusalem reached Italy in late summer. The new pope, Paschal II (1099-1118), sent legates into France as well. Perhaps just as important, he re-issued Urban's threat to excommunicate anyone who had taken the crusading vow but who had not yet actually gone. By the end of 1099 armies were being raised from all over western Europe. 

The Arabs were hardly more united in 1100 than they had been in 1096. There were at least as many crusaders in this second wave as had been in the first. The Latins were hopeful and confident, eager to equal the accomplishments of the great heroes who had won Jerusalem.

The Armies and their Leaders

As in the First Crusade, these pilgrims did not all leave together but rather moved out as national armies from their various regions. The most important groups were the Lombards, the Burgundians, the Bavarians under Duke Welf, the Aquitainians led by Duke William, and armies led by William of Nevers, Stephen of Blois and Raymond St. Gilles. With a few exceptions, these were all from regions only lightly affected by the preaching in the First Crusade, and there was a strong sense of having missed out. The armies all left at different times, with the Lombards being the first to go (September 1100) and the last of them leaving in the spring of 1101.

As in the First Crusade, too, this crusade had no effective leader and was, in truth, even more scattered and haphazard in its progress. The Lombards were a motley bunch, somewhat similar to those who marched in the People's Crusade. The leaders, mentioned above, were from about the same ranks of European nobility as the original leaders had been. There were still no kings leading, for much the same reasons as there had been no kings in 1096. Once again there was an archbishop designated by the pope as leader, and once again he was generally ignored.

The crusaders appeared to have no clear plans. Most were going to help out in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, but there are some slight indications that some, at least, may have intended to invade Iraq and even to attack Baghdad. Certainly some hoped to win lands for themselves as the original crusaders had done, but it should be noted that the vast majority of crusaders did not remain in the Holy Land and the newcomers probably intended to imitate that model: go, win great battles, obtain spiritual grace, visit holy sites, perhaps come away with a relic or two, then return home.

The Lombards March

The Lombards left from Milan on 13 September 1100. They crossed through Carinthia and into Hungary, spending the winter in Bulgaria. They had already heard about the "treacherous Greeks" and relations with the Byzantines were sour from the beginning. They quarreled with the locals all along the route and when they finally arrived at Constantinople, Emperor Alexius, by now quite fed up with rag-tag Latin armies, refused to allow them to enter the city. 

The Lombards cooled their heels for two months outside the city while their leaders negotiated for supplies and for transport across the Bosporus. They were such violent and demanding guests that Alexius finally ferried them over to get them out of his hair (21 April 1101). The Lombards waited at Nicomedia, having been advised they should not set out into Asia Minor without additional troops.

In the meantime, the crusaders learned of a great calamity that had befallen Outremer: the great Prince of Antioch, Bohemond, had been captured by the Turks. Moreover, it was learned, he was being held in Khorassan (in Pontus). The Lombards naturally felt specially called to rescue their countryman. Before they set out, they were joined by the Burgundians, northern Frenchmen under Stephen of Blois, and a small group of Provençals under Raymond of Toulouse (being nursed to health after a serious illness by the Emperor's own doctor). 

The French urged the Lombards to wait, but they could not prevail. Rather than see them go unaided, the French agreed to accompany them. It did not help that St. Gilles was urging caution, for the Lombards were convinced that he was the Emperor's lackey and that the Emperor would like nothing better than to let Bohemond languish in a Turkish prison. 

The Turks, for their part, had managed to put aside their differences to meet this new invasion. They had learned their lesson from the previous disasters and were determined that the Christians should not get through. Kilij Arslan, who had personal grievances with the Franks, led the united tribes. The Lombards set out in June, and from Chankiri onward the Turks harassed them unmercifully. No one really knew where Bohemond was being held, and their guides proved somewhat unreliable (or so the Christian sources report), and the crusade wandered a bit though it headed generally eastward.

Defeat

The Turks brought the crusaders to ground near the mountains of Paphlagonia at Mersivan. The terrain was well-suited to the Turks—dry and infertile, with plenty of open space for their horses. They had been harassing the Latins for some days, making sure they went where Kilij Arslan wanted them to go and making sure, too, that they did not find too many supplies.

The battle was spread out over several days. On the first, the Turks cut off the crusader advance and surrounded them. The next day, Duke Conrad led his Germans in a sortie that failed doubly. Not only did they fail to open the Turkish lines, they were unable to return to the main crusader army and had to take refuge in a nearby stronghold.

No serious fighting took place on the third day. Then, on the fourth, the crusaders made a concerted effort to break free of the trap. The crusaders fought fiercely, inflicting heavy losses on the Turks, but the attack ultimately failed. Kilij Arslan had been joined by Ridwan of Aleppo, Malik-Ghazi of Sebastia, and Karaja of Harran, all powerful Danishmend princes. The Latins were hopelessly outnumbered.

That night, the noble leaders of the crusade decided to abandon the fight and the army. They slipped away under cover of night in small bands, heading for the mountains. The Turks pursued as many as they could, and cut down those they caught. The next morning, the fifth day of the battle, the Turks assaulted the Christian camp. With the bulk of the knights gone, the army was helpless. Many were slaughtered, the rest were enslaved. Those who managed to escape were hunted down in the hills, though some few did manage to get away.

Aftermath of Mersivan

Raymond of Toulouse, Stephen of Blois, and many of the other great lords managed to escape the debacle and to return to Constantinople. They were widely criticized for the catastrophe by the other crusaders who were still in the city. Raymond was suspect. Emperor Alexius was blamed for failing to send his own troops. Some even said that Alexius had tipped off the Turks, not wishing to see the hated Bohemond freed.

This victory was a sweet one for Kilij Arslan, for it avenged his honor and restored his standing among the Danishmends. But he could not enjoy his victory, for he knew that more crusader armies were on their way.

The Nivernais Expedition

Count William of Nevers had in the meantime set out into Asia Minor on his own hook. He had come by way of Italy, crossing the Adriatic at Brindisi and arriving at Constantinople on 14 June 1101. Upon learning of the Lombard expedition, he set out almost at once, crossing the Bosporus on 24 June and setting out in pursuit.

By the time he reached Ankara it was plain that he was not going to catch up with them. Many in his army were not interested in rescuing the Norman, pointing out that their vows stated they were to go to Jerusalem. So William turned south, heading for Iconium (modern-day Konya). This was central Anatolia, a dry and harsh land ill-suited to the support of armies.

Finding Iconium too well-defended, and not wishing to risk a siege, William pressed on to Heraclea. This city was not defended at all, but the Turks had removed most of the supplies and had poisoned the wells. The army had no choice but to press on. It was now mid-August. The Lombard army had already been destroyed, though William did not know this.

The land south of Heraclea was a desert. The army struggled forward for a few days, for there was no other choice. Once they were sufficiently worn down, the Turks attacked. Once again the knights abandoned the foot soldiers, leaving the common people to be slaughtered and enslaved.

William and his knights hired locals to guide them through the desert, but their guides betrayed them. William and his men were robbed, stripped, and left on foot in the wilderness to perish. Amazingly, a handful of them, William included, managed to walk out of the desert, through the mountains and at last down to Antioch.

A second crusader army had been annihilated.

The Aquitainian Expedition

The third army consisted of Duke William of Aquitaine's men. William is rather famous as the troubador prince, for he was a great patron of the troubadors in southern France. He was a highly cultured individual who wrote poetry himself. He left his homeland in March and took the overland route, being joined along the way by the Poitevins and by Welf, Duke of Bavaria.

This army arrived in Constantinople in early June. They chose not to follow William of Nevers in pursuit of the Lombards; most felt they should proceed directly to Jerusalem. They were on hand to hear of the catastrophe in Paphlagonia. A portion, including most of the Germans, decided to go by sea rather than risk the overland route. The French now decided take the Nivernais route, marching into the interior and arriving at Heraclea in early September.

Kilij Arslan was fresh from his victory in the north. He ambushed the Aquitainians near Heraclea and wiped them out. At least here the knights actually stayed with the army and fought. The only result of their courage was that they, too, died.

William managed to escape, accompanied only by his squire, as did a handful of others. They made their way down to Tarsus and then returned to Constantinople. Alexius was bitterly disappointed in the poor showing of the Latin armies. Poor guests as they were, at least the previous crusaders had managed to defeat the Turks!

Effects of the Disasters in Outremer

In the space of two months, three large crusader armies had been almost completely destroyed. There was now no one to rescue the Prince of Antioch. There would be no armies to reinforce Jerusalem in its struggle with Egypt. There would be no influx of settlers to populate the Holy Land with Latin Christians. And Emperor Alexius at last understood that the West would be of no assistance to him in his struggle to recover Greek territories from the Turks.

These losses made it plain to everyone that the Crusader States were on their own. While individuals and very small groups continued to make their way to Outremer, some to settle, some for a single campaigning season, the Holy Land would have to be held by only a few hundred knights and a few thousand more footsoldiers. This forced Baldwin and the others to look for allies among their enemies, to enter into the complex politics of the Near East, and to become Oriental in their outlook. It also caused them to look eagerly to the Italian city-states, with their strong navies and promise of steady supplies, and to give into their demands for a near-monopoly on trade.

Effects of the Disasters in Europe

The effects in Europe were equally profound. Three whole armies destroyed. Thousands killed, and they never even made it out of Anatolia, much less arrived in the Holy Land. An objective observer might say that this was hardly more than to be expected, given the raw numerical superiority of the Islamic forces fighting on their home ground. But the success of the First Crusade had led Europeans rather to expect the miraculous, and the failures in 1101 seemed to need explaining.

The result was that Europe quickly lost its taste for crusading. There was some renewed effort around 1108, but there was no general call for crusade until the fall of Edessa in 1145. An entire generation passed in Europe, and the First Crusade passed into legend.

This long hiatus—the longest in the entire history of the Crusades—was due not only to the catastrophies of 1101, but also due to the fact that the papacy was entering into a renewed struggle with the Empire, first with Henry IV and then in a bitter war with Henry V. This was not settled until 1122, by which time the initial enthusiasm for crusading had long past.

Final Fate of the Crusaders

There are some postscripts to the Crusade of 1101 that are worth recounting. The survivors who gathered back at Constantinople—Count Raymond, William of Aquitaine, Stephen of Blois, William of Nevers, Conrad the Constable of Germany, Welf of Bavaria—were still determined to fulfill their vows. Alexius was so glad to be rid of them that he gave them ships and sent them on to Syria.

They landed at Saint Symeon in January of 1102 and proceeded to Antioch. Raymond's ship had gone off course and landed instead at Tarsus. Immediately upon his arrival, a knight stepped up and arrested the Count for his flight from Mersivan. He was turned over to Tancred, regent of Antioch. He was eventually released, but this took Raymond out of the subsequent events.

The others went from Antioch down to Beirut, where they were met by a large armed guard sent north by King Baldwin for their protection. The Kingdom of Jerusalem still hung by a thread and armies were on the march that spring. In fact, Baldwin had just won a tremendous victory over an Egyptian army the previous September, even as the crusaders had been losing spectacularly in Asia Minor. But the Egyptians were said to be planning another invasion. Few as they were, these Latins were a welcome addition. 

The newcomers at last fulfilled their vows and worshipped at the Holy Sepulchre. After visiting other holy sites, they decided to return home. They certainly did not linger to aid Baldwin: they had done their tour and were already ship-board by the end of April, 1102. William of Aquitaine and others made it home safely, but the ship carrying Stephen of Blois and Stephen of Burgundy was driven ashore by a storm off Jaffa. They were unable to find another ship, and in the meantime, word came that the expected second Egyptian invasion had arrived. Stephen decided to stay and help.

Second Battle of Ramleh

The Egyptians were determined to avenge their embarassing defeat of the previous year. The army amounted to about twenty thousand and was commanded by the Vizier's son, Sharaf al-Ma'ali. It arrived at Ascalon in mid-May, 1102, and advanced toward Ramleh.

Baldwin's forces, amounting to only a few thousand, were assembled at Jaffa (where Count Stephen found them). His reconnaissance was poor, however. He believed that he was facing only a raiding party and decided to advance without calling up his reserves, and to attack with only the knights. Stephen of Blois suggested caution and better reconnaissance, but of course his earlier cowardice ensured that no one would listen to him.

On 17 May, King Baldwin set out with about five hundred men. They rode straight into the Egyptians and their twenty thousand, and were spotted immediately. Before he had time to retreat, Baldwin found himself cut off. So he charged. The Egyptians could not believe that so few would charge so many and at first believed they were the forerunners of the full Christian army. But no one else showed up, and the Egyptians gathered their shaken resolve and attacked in full force.

A few managed to cut through to Jaffa, but many died on the field. Baldwin and others, including Stephen, were able to break out and reach Ramleh, where there was a small fortress, crowding into a single small tower. They were immediately surrounded, of course. During the night, Baldwin slipped out under cover of darkness and escaped. A few others did likewise, each scattering in separate directions. One of these made it to Jerusalem where he told of the disaster, but also encouraged the citizens to defend the city.

At dawn, the Egyptians piled wood around the tower. Rather than be burned alive, the Christians charged. Constable Conrad of Germany so impressed the Egyptians with his prowess that they spared his life, along with about a hundred others, who were all sent as captives to Cairo. Stephen of Blois died on the battlefield, at last redeeming his reputation.

The great crusade thus stumbled to an end in yet one more disaster. There would be no more grand expeditions for another four decades.

THE END

Norway massacre suspect driven by "Crusade"

The man suspected of Norway's gun and bomb massacre had belonged to an anti-immigration party and opposed multi-culturalism, Islam and the "cultural Marxists" of the establishment, web postings, acquaintances and officials said Saturday.

Anders Behring Breivik was accused of gunning down 85 people at a youth camp and killing another seven in a bomb attack on Friday.
"Before we can start our crusade we must do our duty by decimating cultural marxism," said a caption under a video called "Knights Templar 2083" on the YouTube website.
At the end of the approximately 12 minute clip, several images appear of Breivik, including one of him in a Navy Seal type scuba diving outfit pointing an automatic weapon.
Two pictures also appeared earlier on a Facebook page created on July 17. The video was uploaded to YouTube on July 22, the day of the attacks.
A Norwegian discussion website provided a link to an 1,500 page electronic book by an individual called Andrew Berwick, who also uploaded the video. In the book, Berwick is revealed as Anders Behring Breivik.
It could not be verified who posted the video or who wrote the book.
Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat on its website reported that at least one Finnish politician, a member of the populist True Finns, received the e-mail manifesto Friday afternoon.
"Once you decide to strike, it is better to kill too many than not enough, or you risk reducing the desired ideological impact of the strike," the book said.
Norway has traditionally been open to immigration, which has been criticized by the Progress Party, of which Breivik was for a short time a member. The Labor Party, whose youth camp Breivik attacked, has long been in favor of immigration.
In the book, there is a direct reference to the summer camp where he writes about infiltrating the youth camp of a ruling party and assassinating the party leader.
The video and book are in contrast to the more measured tones used by Breivik in 2009 and 2010 in comments on blogs on a Norwegian website critical of Islam, www.documents.no.
"What most people still do not understand is that the ongoing Islamicisation of Europe cannot be stopped before one gets to grips with the political doctrine which it make possible (and the individuals which front these doctrines)," he wrote in October 2009.
Another entry dated February 16 last year said: "According to two studies, 13 percent of young British Muslims aged between 15 and 25 support al Qaeda ideology."
He does not advocate violence in any of the comments.
Breivik wrote he was a backer of the "Vienna School of Thought," which was against multi-culturalism and the spread of Islam. He also wrote he admired Geert Wilders, the populist anti-Islam Dutch politician, for following that school.
The Vienna reference seems to concern the halt of the Ottoman Turkish invasion at Vienna in 1683.
Wilders said in a statement on Saturday: "I despise everything he stands for and everything he did."
QUIET AT SCHOOL
Breivik was a freemason, said a spokesman for the organization. Freemasons meet in secretive fraternal groups in many parts of the world.
The suspected killer was also a member of the Oslo gun club and was fond of weightlifting. Police said Breivik carried a pistol and an automatic weapon during the attack, adding he had never before come to the attention of the police.
"He was rather introverted at school, even though he was a good student," said Michael Tomola, who knew Breivik from the age of 13 to 16 at the school they went to in an Oslo suburb.
"I'm very surprised by this (attack). I had a good impression, although he became very engaged in subjects he cared for. He got very extreme about things he cared for," Tomola told Reuters.
The Facebook page set up last week included a variety of interests such as hunting and political and stock analysis.

His tastes in music included classical and trance, a hypnotic form of dance music.
The profile veered between references to political philosophers and gory popular films, TV shows and video games.
Nina Hjerpset-Ostlie, a contributing journalist to the website, said she had met Breivik at a meeting in late 2009.

"The only thing we noticed about him is that he seemed like anyone else and that he had some very high-flying, unrealistic, ideas about marketing of our website," she told Reuters.

Police searched an apartment in an Oslo suburb Friday, which neighbors said belonged to Breivik's mother.
"It is the mother who lives there. She is a very polite lady, pleasant and very friendly," said Hemet Noaman, 27, an accounting consultant who lives in the same building in the upmarket part of the capital.
"He often came to visit his mother but did not live here."

Breivik, who attended a middle class high school called Handelsgym in Oslo, had also been a member of the Progress Party, the second-largest in parliament. He was a member from 2004-2006 and in its youth party from 1997-2006/2007.

The Progress Party wants far tighter restrictions on immigration, whereas the center-left government backs multi-culturalism. The party leads some public opinion polls.
A politician who met Breivik in 2002-2003, when he was interested in Oslo politics, said he did not attract attention.

"I got the impression that he was a modest person ... he was well dressed, it seemed like he was well educated," Joeran Kallmyr, 33, an Oslo municipality politician representing the Progress Party, told Reuters.
Progress leader Siv Jensen stressed Breivik had left the party and that she regretted he had been a member.

“O’ Muslims! What have you done?”

So long as we keep blaming others for our woes, so long we will not realize that the fault is ours for allowing others to take advantage of us. Pakistan pompously professes to be an Islamic Republic but doesn’t know what that means. Which Islam? The Islam of God or one of the 72 versions of the cleric? That is our core problem from which all other problems arise. We don’t know who we are and why we are. This leads to an erosion of self-confidence and self-esteem (except in rhetoric), the lack of which make us in thrall of alien ideologies and their political, economic and social constructs.

This poem on the Holy Quran written some 35 years ago by the ninth President of India, Dr. Pandit Shanker Dayal Sharma, says it beautifully. It’s very good because it’s very true. I have translated it myself.

Amal ki kitab thi.

Dua ki kitab bana dia

(English)It was a Command for action.

(English)You turned it into a book of prayer.

Samajhne ki kitab thi.

Parhne ki kitab bana dia.

(English)It was a Book to understand.

(English)You read it without understanding.

Zindaon ka dastoor tha.

Murdon ka manshoor bana dia.

(English)It was a code for the living.

(English)You turned it into a manifesto of the dead.

Jo ilm ki kitab thi.

Usay la ilmon ke hath thama dia.

(English)That which was a book of knowledge;

(English)You abdicated to the ignoramus.

Taskheer-e-kayenaat ka dars denay aayi thi.

Sirf madrason ka nisaab bana dia.

(English)It came to give knowledge of Creation.

(English)You abandoned it to the madrasa.

Murda qaumon ko zinda karne aayi thi.

Murdon ko bakhshwane per laga dia.

(English)It came to give life to dead nations.

(English)You used it for seeking mercy for the dead.

Aye Musalmano ye tum nay kia kiya?

(English)O’ Muslims! What have you done?


Please don’t take kneejerk offense. Righteous rage before thinking is a hallmark of the ignoramus. Don’t focus on who says something but on what he says.

Look at the Muslim condition. They remain on the lowest rung of the ladder. The Jews, numbering less than the people who live in Karachi, are on the top rung. Why? Because they educated themselves, used their minds, recognized and understood the real levers of power, bought stakes in them and became the most powerful people in the world. The Muslims, on the other hand, remain mired in ignorance, waiting for Divine deliverance without bothering to lift a finger, fooling only themselves by wallowing in their undoubtedly glorious past, deluded in their present illusions. They live on homilies and humbug.

The total GDP of all 57 Muslim majority countries put together is less than the GDP of California. The turnover of some top multi-nationals is more. Muslims have the highest illiteracy rate in the world, the lowest educational levels, lower still in subjects that matter like science, the highest birth rate, the highest female and child mortality rates, not a single world class school, university or hospital, no state institutions worth a dime, no nothing. All we have is a bomb and one good friend that some ‘heavenly’ Muslims regard as ‘godless’. If they only knew their religion properly they would be shocked to realize that China is closer to the ideal Islamic state than any Muslim country is.

Muslims were enjoined to become the “central community” that others could emulate – ummatun wusuta. Instead, we’ve become a model of what not to emulate. Of 57 Muslim majority states, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran call themselves ‘Islamic’. That’s a big claim, so big that it makes one’s heart quake. However, it’s most incumbent upon Pakistan to deliver for it claims it was made in the name of Islam in order to create that model Islamic state that God wanted. To what extent has Pakistan discharged that responsibility? Zero.

Riba is usury and exploitation of all and any sort. It is rampant. When they call usury by another name it doesn’t change its exploitative and un-Islamic nature. Calling riba ‘interest’ is the mark of hypocrisy. Calling it ‘mark up’ is the mark of the devil. There is no such thing as ‘interest’ distinct from usury. It is only a slight of tongue, a play of words devised by the rapacious. Pakistan’s is an economy based on usury upon usury, something that has brought the western economic system to the brink. Our banks charge inordinate amounts in usury on the ignorant excuse that it will lower inflation when it actually raises it. We pay inordinate amounts in usury for our unconscionable debt addiction to live an illusory life of luxury having collateralizing our sovereignty and our soul. Living beyond one’s means is stupidity in the extreme. It is defiance of the Divine. We belong to Dr. Faustus. Luckily, Dr. Faustus is terminally ill with a disease called usury.

Pakistan has all but lost its sovereignty. You know what that means for a state that calls itself Islamic? All sovereignty belongs to the Almighty. He has conditionally devolved some of it on humanity because He has appointed Man his khalifa or vicegerent – a sovereign’s administrative deputy – since humankind is His greatest creation (ashraful makhlooqat). Thus what we have trashed is the sovereignty God devolved on us. Great going!

Pakistan has all but lost its nationhood. You know what that means? The best translation of the Arabic world ummah that I have seen is ‘nation’ – nation of believers in One God within which is the Muslim ummah. That is the first pillar of Islam – Tauheed – belief in One God. So by losing our Pakistani nationhood, are we perhaps not in danger of losing our place in the ummah as a whole? Big talk comes easy for it comes cheap – “Pakistan is an Islamic Republic” – but it’s very difficult to live up to. Don’t bite off more than you can chew. Certainly don’t bite if you have no intention of chewing. Most certainly don’t bite if you don’t even know how to chew, not if you have borrowed dentures for which you are paying usury.

Like apes we mimic our master’s systems. God tells us to ‘choose’ from amongst ourselves and from amongst the best. ‘Choose’ implies democracy. Our British system ensures that we choose from amongst the worst. Our parliament-cum-legislature is not only supposed to be an advisory body but also a law making one. Yet it comprises people who know little about jurisprudence, Islamic or Anglo Saxon. The adjudicature includes lawyers many of whom are on a rampage of illegality. Judges are more concerned with matters facetious than with issues requiring immediate justice. We have no institutions with expert jurists to make laws. When law, advice, governance are missing it means Amr bil ma’roof wan nahi ‘an Al Munkar – those who command good and forbid evil – are missing.

Hijab and Contemporary Muslim Women

Those who support the French State 's decision to ban hijab from its schools argue that the law is a necessary step to protect young Muslim girls, as French citizens, from fundamentalist pressure to wear hijab. Such a law, thus, penalizes innocent girls who wish to cover in order to protect those who do not wish to cover. The French see hijab as more than just a piece of cloth.

The girls who wear it are not innocent; they are, in fact, seen as signs of a cancer in the French body politic - "Islamic fundamentalism". That the French see the hijab in this way is due to an old and resilient Orientalist stereotype of the hijab as a symbol of Muslim women's oppression. This idea was introduced into Western discourse in the early eighteenth century and was given "teeth" during the colonial era. During the British and French occupations of the Middle East , the colonialists went to great lengths to unveil Muslim women.

The Europeans' campaigns against the veil were eventually successful, as a new generation of Muslims internalized the Western colonial view of the veil as a symbol of backwardness. A society that wished to modernize had to follow the secular, Western path or else be condemned to the backwater of history. In 1936, the Shah of Iran initiated a policy of forced unveiling of women, decreeing that they wear Western women's dress. Taxi drivers could be fined if they accepted veiled passengers; policemen would pull scarves off women's heads in the streets and were actually instructed to shred a woman's veil with scissors if she was caught wearing it in public. (This is the secular equivalent of the "religious police" in Iran , Saudi Arabia and Taliban Afghanistan , who enforce the wearing of hijab. The French State 's decision to ban hijab in its schools, while not being enforced with police violence, is nevertheless part of the same phenomenon of state coercion in the name of modernity.)

By the 1960s, the colonial and Muslim modernizing elites' attacks on the veil had been largely successful. Only rural, peasant or lower-class urban women continued to cover. The urban, modern woman who wanted to "get ahead" did not cover and scorned those who did as illiterate, backward peasants. Thus, the movement for re-veiling, which has swept the Muslim world since the early 1970s, has surprised many observers. Social science research into the phenomena has revealed that the "re-veiling movement", as it is called (though it is not really re-veiling, since most of the women are adopting hijab for the first time), is a women-driven movement. That is, contrary to media reports and the opinions of intellectuals who aim to foster fear of and hatred towards Muslims, the re-veiling movement is not the result of fundamentalist violence or coercion, but the result of women choosing to cover.

Academic research has, also, highlighted the fact that the motivations and meanings behind covering are extremely diverse; though the women may look similar in their dress, they are not thinking similarly, nor experiencing hijab similarly. This is an important point to make because those who would claim that the hijab is a sign of oppression ignore the multiple sociological meanings that hijab carries. According to some analysts, the first impetus of the re-veiling movement was the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel . This event made many Muslims reconsider the paths of Westernization and modernization that their countries were pursuing. Many felt that their heritage and religion had been sidelined in the process, and they turned to Islam for solace during those difficult times. Many women adopted hijab as a part of this new mental state. (Many men grew beards and began wearing the traditional jalabiyya.) It is important to note that the style of hijab adopted by these women was new and quite different from traditional forms of covering worn by their ancestors.

Instead of a large piece of material wrapped around the body and, often, a face veil, these women adopted long coats and head-scarves pinned under the chin. For these women, the hijab was a combination of piety and political protest. One Egyptian woman told Williams , during his 1978 study into why Egyptian women embraced the veil, "Until 1967, I accepted the way our country was going. I thought Gamal Abd al-Nasser would lead us all to progress. Then, the war showed that we had been lied to; nothing was the way it had been represented. I started to question everything we were told. I wanted to do something and to find my own way. I prayed more and more, and I tried to see what was expected of me as a Muslim woman. Then, I put on shar'i dress…" Hessini found similar sentiments of political protest in her 1989 study of urban and professional Moroccan women who had adopted hijab. One woman, Hadija, stated, "the hijab is a way for me to retreat from a world that has disappointed me. It's my own little sanctuary."

Some women felt that, in adopting this dress, they were proactively working to improve their societies and promoting social justice. Nadia told Hessini, "My religion saved me. In a world where there is no justice, I now believe in something that is just. I now have something I can count on." Many women, however, have prioritized religious belief as the main motivation behind their decision to cover. Their adopting the new style of hijab is meant to express their adherence to "true Islam." Sou'al told Hessini, "My mother has always worn the veil, but she knows nothing about Islam. She wore the veil out of tradition, whereas I wear it out of conviction." My own research amongst Toronto Muslim women in 1994, also, found similar motivations. Yasmeen, an immigrant to Canada from the Middle East , who is in her early thirties, told me, "I feel in peace [wearing hijab], and ah…I feel I respect myself more. I am not concentrated about my beauty and ah… the fashion and this stuff ah...I think it's a peace of mind…I feel comfortable because this is what God want from the human being, ah…I am obeying."

But the hijab carries a multitude of meanings. Researchers in Egypt , for instance, have found that not all those who adopt hijab do so out of religious sentiments. Many of these women do not pray regularly, nor do they discuss hijab as a religious form of dress. Rather, they have found in hijab an empowering dress that facilitates their access to education and work. Often coming from urban lower class families and being the first woman in the family to achieve formal education, hijab has, for them, served the purpose of declaring their modesty to a conservative milieu, in spite of the fact that they are outside the family home for extended periods a day. They also find economic advantages of hijab; by wearing hijab, they do not have to spend huge amounts of money on work clothing. Sommayya told Hoodfar (1991) that she was having trouble with her fiancé and his family who did not want her to work after marriage; she solved the problem by wearing hijab; "if I have only two sets of clothes, I can look smart at all times because nobody expects muhaggabat (the veiled ones) to wear new clothes every day. This will save me a lot of money. It will, also, prevent people from talking about me or questioning my honor or my husband's. In this way, I have solved all the problems, and my husband's family is very happy that he is marrying a muhaggabat."

Muslim women in the West find other compelling reasons to wear hijab, one of which is to assert their Muslim identity publicly and with pride, something which is especially important to them as citizens of Western, multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious polities. Nadia, a second generation British Asian woman, who began to cover when she was sixteen, told Watson (1994), "My cultural background and my family's roots are in another part of the world. These things are very important to me and make me feel special. It is important to me not to lose these parts of my life. My decision to wear the veil also ties into my feeling of coming from this different kind of background. We are a British family but because of Islam and our links with Pakistan we have different values and traditions from the families of my non- Muslim friends…[So] wearing the veil makes me feel special, it's a kind of badge of identity and a sign that my religion is important to me."

Even in Saudi Arabia , where there is no obvious choice about veiling, some women feel they are wearing hijab as a symbol of identity and pride. As a 35 year old teacher, married with two children and holding a BA in education from the United States , told AlMunajjed (1997), "'Yes, I wear the veil out of conviction'. 'On what do you base your conviction?' [AlMunajjed] asked. 'I am attached to my traditions. Wearing a veil is part of one's identity of being a Saudi woman. It is a definite proof of one's identification with the norms and values of the Saudi culture.'"

Thus, sociologically, the hijab carries many meanings, and it is wrong for the West to argue that the hijab is a symbol of male domination over women or a sign of fundamentalist threat or coercion. I say "wrong" purposefully, even though empirically it may sometimes be true. There are Muslim women who are forced to cover against their will, either due to state policy, Islamist violence or family coercion. I condemn coercion and violence perpetrated against Muslim women by those who seek to impose hijab. However, just because there are some women who experience hijab in this unfortunately negative way, it does not turn the hijab into a symbol of coercion. To be a symbol, the thing being represented must have a constant meaning. Quite simply, hijab signifies a variety of things, depending on the historical and social context. We have seen a wide range of meanings that arise out of the contemporary Muslim women's re-veiling movement.

There are other meanings too. Prior to the European intervention into the Middle East , the face veil was a symbol of wealth and status. In the 1950s during the Algerian war of Independence , secularized, urban women don ned headscarves to show their support of the war; the hijab was a symbol of resistance to French colonial rule. In the 1979 Iranian Revolution a similar process took place, with secular women joining religious women to wear chador as a sign that they supported the movement against the Shah. These women grew up not covering, but the chador became a symbol of the anti-Shah revolution.

Thus, hijab expresses many meanings, and commentators should be wary of attempting to impose one single meaning on it. In addition, the West should take notice that many Muslim women wear hijab with pride, conviction and happiness. I do not mean to downplay the tragedy of a Muslim woman who is forced to wear hijab out of coercion, but the prevalent image of the veil in the West, as a symbol of oppression, ignores the real expression women find in hijab. Furthermore, this is not simply an academic matter because public policy is being founded on the misconception of hijab as a symbol of oppression; state policies are being made to 'save' the Muslim women. The French decision to ban the veil is based on this kind of logic. It is a dangerous precedent because it will encourage and inflame both Islamophobia in the West and extremism in the Muslim world. The only reasonable way forward is for people to understand the multiple and positive meanings of hijab; allow people to freely practice their religious convictions; and to work together to eradicate coercion and violence in ways that do not denigrate religious convictions.

Hijab and My Story

In 1991 I saw a news report on the television that showed Turkish women who were returning to the veil. I felt shocked and saddened for them. "Poor things," I thought, “they are being brainwashed by their culture." Like many Westerners, I believed that Islam oppressed women and that the veil was a symbol of their oppression. Imagine my surprise then, four years later, at seeing my own reflection in a store window, dressed exactly like those oppressed women. I had embarked on a spiritual journey during my Master's degree that culminated four years later in my conversion to Islam. The journey included moving from hatred of Islam, to respect, to interest, to acceptance. Naturally, being a woman, the issue of the veil was central. Despite my attraction to the theological foundations of Islam, I was deeply troubled by what I believed to be practices oppressive to women. I felt that the veil was a cultural tradition that Muslim women could surely work to eliminate. I was shown the verses in the Qur'an that, many Muslims believe, enjoin covering on men and women, and it seemed quite clear to me then that, indeed, the verses did impose covering. I wandered home, feeling quite depressed and sorry for Muslim women. If the verses were clear, they had no recourse: covering would be required for a believing Muslim woman. I had to put these issues aside in order to decide whether or not to accept Islam. What counted, in the final analysis, was the fundamental theological message of the religion- - that there is a single God, and that Muhammad (SAAS) was His Last Servant and Messenger. After several years of study, I had no doubt about that …..if only it were not for the issue of women and Islam. When I finally made my decision to convert, now one and a half years into my doctorate (July 1994), I decided that whether I liked it or not, I should cover. It was a commandment, and I would obey. I warned some people in my department that I had become a Muslim, and that the next time they saw me I would be covered.

Needless to say, people were quite shocked, and as word spread (and as people saw me in my new dress), I found myself subject to some hostile treatment. How could I have embraced an oppressive practice, especially when I was known as a strong and committed feminist? How could I embrace Islam? Had I not heard what Hamas had just done? Had I not heard what some Muslim men had just done to a woman? I was not quite prepared for this hostility, nor was I prepared for the different way I was being treated by secretaries, bureaucrats, medical personnel, or general strangers on the subway. I felt the same, but I was often being treated with contempt. I was not treated as I had been as a white, middle-class woman. It was my first personal experience of discrimination and racism, and made me see my previous privileged position in a way that I had never before properly understood.

Written By :
Dr. Katherine Bullock is the editor of American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences and author of “Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil” ( London : IIIT, 2002).

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